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Abstract: Companies collect personally identifiable
information that website visitors are not always comfortable
sharing. One proposed remedy is to use economics rather
than legislation to address privacy risks by creating a
marketplace for privacy where website visitors would choose
to accept or reject offers for small payments in exchange for
loss of privacy. The notion of micropayments for privacy has
not been realized in practice, perhaps because advertisers
might be willing to pay a penny per name and IP address, yet
few people would sell their contact information for only a
penny. 1 In this paper we contend that the time to read
privacy policies is, in and of itself, a form of payment.
Instead of receiving payments to reveal information, website
visitors must pay with their time to research policies in order
to retain their privacy. We pose the question: if website
users were to read the privacy policy for each site they visit
just once a year, what would their time be worth?
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Studies show privacy policies are hard to read, read
infrequently, and do not support rational decision making.
We calculated the average time to read privacy policies in
two ways. First, we used a list of the 75 most popular
websites and assumed an average reading rate of 250 words
per minute to find an average reading time of lo minutes per
policy. Second, we conducted an online study of 212
participants to measure time to skim online privacy policies
and respond to simple comprehension questions. We used
data from Nielsen/Net Ratings to estimate the number of
unique websites the average Internet user visits annually
with a lower bound of 119 sites. We estimated the total
number of Americans online based on Pew Internet &
American Life data and Census data. Finally, we estimated
the value of time as 25% of average hourly salary for leisure
and twice wages for time at work. We present a range of
values, and found the national opportunity cost for just the
time to read policies is on the order of $781 billion.
Additional time for comparing policies between multiple
sites in order to make informed decisions about privacy
brings the social cost well above the market for online
advertising. Given that web users also have some value for
their privacy on top of the time it takes to read policies, this
suggests that under the current self-regulation framework,




The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") supports industry self-
regulation for online privacy.2 In the late 199os, the FTC decided that
the Internet was evolving very quickly and new legislation could stifle
growth. In particular, there were concerns that it was premature to
legislate to protect privacy before other mechanisms evolved,
especially when business was expected to offer more effective and
efficient responses than FTC staff could devise. The Internet was still
young, commerce on the Internet was very new, and legislators and
regulators adopted a hands-off approach rather than risk stifling
innovation. However, concerns remained about data privacy in
general and on the Internet in particular. For example, the FTC
recommended legislation to protect children's privacy, which led to
the Children's Online Protection Act ("COPPA") in 1998.3
Prior to COPA, the FTC adopted Fair Information Principles
("FIPs"), a set of ideals around data use. The notion of FIPs predates
the Internet; several nations adopted differing FIPs in response to
concerns about credit databases on mainframes in the 1970s.4 While
FIPs do not themselves carry the force of law, they provide a set of
principles for legislation and government oversight. In this way they
are similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which
Article 12 states the principle that "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks," but leaves the specific legal implementations
of those ideals in the hands of individual nations.5
2 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, "Privacy Online: Fair
Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace" (prepared statement before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington D.C., May 25,
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/o5/testimonyprivacy.htm.
3 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, "Self-Regulation and
Privacy Online" (prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, Washington D.C., July 27, 1999),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/o7/privacyonlinetestimony.pdf.
4 Kenneth C. Laudon, "Markets and Privacy," Communications of the ACM 39, no. 9
(1996): 96.
5 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, 1948,
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf.
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The five FIPs the FrC adopted in 1973-notice/awareness,
choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security, and
enforcement/redress-are a subset of the eight protections ensconced
in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Data Flows of Personal Data.6 The FIP of notice underlies the notion
of privacy policies, which are mechanisms for companies to disclose
their practices. In 1998, the FTC commissioned a report that found
while 92% of U.S. commercial websites collected some type of data,
only 14% provided comprehensive notice of their practices.7 The FrC
was concerned that the FIP of notice/awareness was not faring well on
the new Internet: consumers did not know where their data went or
what it might be used for.8
Voluntary disclosure formed the basis of an industry self-
regulation approach to notice. Because privacy policies were
voluntary, there were no requirements for the existence of a policy let
alone any restrictions as to the format, length, readability, or content
of a given privacy policy. In addition to the threat of regulatory action
to spur voluntary disclosure, the FTC also used fraud and deceptive
practices actions to hold companies to whatever content they did
publish. In essence, while a company was not strictly required to post
a policy, once published, the policy became enforceable. In one case
the FTC brought action even without a privacy policy. When
Cartmanager surreptitiously rented their customer lists the FTC
advanced a legal theory of unfairness rather than fraud.9 Cartmanager
provided online shopping cart software and worked with clients who
promised not to sell customer data. The FTC argued that even though
Cartmanager did not have a privacy policy of their own to violate, they
still violated the policies of their clients.1°
6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,"
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/o,3343,en-2 649-34255-1815186 11_1_1,oo.html.
7 Federal Trade Commission, "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace," 4, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy20oo/privacy2ooo.pdf.
8 Ibid., 36.
9 David A. Stampley, Managing Information Technology Security and Privacy
Compliance (Chicago: Neohapsis, May 2005), 3,
http://www.neohapsis.com/utility/NeoPrivacyWhitepaper.pdf (linked to as "Privacy
Compliance").
10 Federal Trade Commission, "Internet Service Provider Settles FTC Privacy Charges,"
news release, March 10, 2005, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo5/o3/cartmanager.shtm.
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The FTC initiated a series of studies of hundreds of commercial
websites to determine how well industry self-regulation worked in
what became known as Internet sweeps. Year after year, the number
of companies offering privacy policies increased. By that metric it
appeared the FTC was successful. However, multiple studies also
showed people were reluctant to shop online because they had privacy
concerns.1 Recall that the Frc's charter is largely financial- barriers
to new markets and commerce are a serious issue. The FrC turned to
two different innovative approaches, rather than legislation or
regulatory action. First, they expressed great hope for online privacy
seals.12 Two seal providers, TRUSTe and the Better Business Bureau
(through BBBOnline), began certifying website privacy policies.
TRUSTe requires companies to follow some basic privacy standards
and document their own practices. TRUSTe also investigates
consumer allegations that licensees are not abiding by their policies.3
However, TRUSTe has come under criticism for not requiring more
rigorous privacy standards. 14 In fact, one study showed that
companies with TRUSTe seals typically offer less privacy-protective
policies than those without TRUSTe seals.'5
Second, the FTC encouraged privacy enhancing technologies
("PETs") with the hope that PETs would put greater control directly
into the hands of consumers. 6 PETs include encryption, anonymity
tools, and other software-based approaches. One particularly
intriguing approach came from the Platform for Privacy Preferences
("P3P") standard, which used privacy policies coded in standardized
machine-readable formats. P3P user agents can determine for
11 Federal Trade Commission, "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace," 2 (see n. 7).
12 Pitofsky, "Self-Regulation and Privacy Online," 5 (see n. 3).
13 TRUSTe, "TRUSTe Program Requirements," http://www.truste.org/requirements.php
(accessed January 19, 2009).
14 Jamie McCarthy, "TRUSTe Decides Its Own Fate Today," Slashdot (November 8, 1999),
http://slashdot.org/yro/99/11/05/1021214.shtml.
15 Carlos Jensen and Colin Potts, "Privacy Policies Examined: Fair Warning or Fair
Game?," GVU Technical Report 03-04 (Feb. 2003): 5,
ftp://ftp.cc.gatech.edu/pub/gvu/tr/2003/o3-o4.pdf.
16 Pitofsky, "Self-Regulation and Privacy Online," 5 (see n. 3).
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customers if a given website provided an acceptable privacy policy.17
Even though P3P support is integrated into popular web browsers,
unfortunately most users remain unfamiliar with the technology.18
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF PRIVACY POLICIES
The FTC started with a set of principles, almost akin to a
framework of rights, and encouraged companies to protect these
rights by adopting privacy policies. Economists also see utility in
privacy policies but from an entirely different basis.
Advertising economics looks at ways to turn a commodity (e.g.,
water) into a bundle of marketable attributes (e.g., from mountain
springs). There are three types of attributes. Search goods are things
readily evaluated in advance, for example color. Experience goods are
only evaluated after purchase or use, for example the claims of a hair
care product. Credence attributes cannot be determined even after
use, for example nutrition content of a food. One argument for
mandatory nutrition labels on food is that it converts nutrition
information from a credence attribute to a search attribute:
consumers can read the label prior to purchase.19 This argument
applies equally well to online privacy. Without a privacy policy,
consumers do not know if a company will send spam until after they
have made the decision to provide their email address. With a privacy
policy, consumers can check privacy protections prior to engaging in
business with the site.
Another economic perspective that leads to supporting privacy
policies is that since privacy is not readily observable, it cannot be
properly valued by the market place. Without privacy policies,
companies have all of the information about their own practices and
17 Lorrie F. Cranor, Praveen Guduru, and Manjula Arjula, "User Interfaces for Privacy
Agents," ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction (TOCHI) 13, no. 2 (June
2006): 135.
18 Carlos Jensen, Colin Potts, and Christian Jensen, "Privacy practices of Internet users:
Self-reports versus observed behavior," International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies 63, no. 1-2 (2005): 212.
19 Andreas C. Drichoutis, Panagiotis Lazaridis, and Rodolfo M. Nayga, "Consumers' Use of
Nutritional Labels: a Review of Research Studies and Issues," Academy of Marketing
Science Review, no. 9 (2006): 1.
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consumers have none, leading to an information asymmetry. 20
Information asymmetries are one potential cause of market failure.
The canonical example is of a market for used cars: sellers know if
their cars are in mint condition or are lemons, but buyers may not be
able to tell.21 Consequently, buyers need to take into account the risk
of getting a bad car, and will not pay top dollar for a great car just in
case they are being taken for a ride.
Privacy policies should help reduce information asymmetries
because companies share information with their customers. However,
researchers also note that if the cost for reading privacy policies is too
high, people are unlikely to read policies. Time is one potential cost,
and the time it takes to read policies may be a serious barrier.22 This
approach assumes rational actors performing personal benefit-cost
analysis, at least on an implicit level, to make individual decisions to
read or skip privacy policies.23 If people feel less benefit reading
policies than they perceive cost of reading them, it stands to reason
people will choose not to read privacy policies.
One question then is what value to place on the time it takes to
read privacy policies. There is a growing literature addressing the
monetary value of time, starting in the mid-1960s.24 For example,
urban planners estimate the value lost to traffic jams when deciding if
it makes sense to invest in new roads or other infrastructure
improvements. 25 As benefit cost analysis increased in popularity,
government agencies found they had a hard time calculating economic
value for "free" services like parks. One way to address their value is
20 Tony Vila, Rachel Greenstadt, and David Molnar, "Why We Can't Be Bothered to Read
Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market," ACM International
Conference Proceeding Series 50 (2003): 403-407.
21 George A. Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970): 488-500.
22 Cranor, Guduru, and Arjula, "User Interfaces for Privacy Agents," 135-36 (see n. 17).
23 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, "Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision
Making," IEEE Security & Privacy 3, no.i (January/February 2005): 24-30.
24 Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," The Economic Journal 75, no. 299
(September 1965): 493-517, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2228949.
25 Timothy Leunig, "Time is Money: A Re-Assessment of the Passenger Social Savings from
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to estimate the time people spend traveling to parks and the value of
the time they spend enjoying the parks, which again requires
estimates of the value of time.26 We draw upon this body of work.
In this paper we look at societal and personal opportunity costs to
read privacy policies. Under the notion of industry self-regulation,
consumers should visit websites, read privacy policies, and choose
which websites offer the best privacy protections. In this way a
market place for online privacy can evolve, and through competition
and consumer pressure, companies have incentives to improve their
privacy protections to a socially optimal level. In practice, industry
self-regulation has fallen short of the FTC vision. First, the Internet is
far more than commercial sites or a place to buy goods. While it may
make sense to contrast the privacy policies of Amazon, Barnes and
Noble, and O'Reilly to purchase the same book, there is no direct
substitute for popular non-commercial sites like Wikipedia. Second,
studies show privacy policies are hard to read,27 read infrequently,28
and do not support rational decision making.29
Several scholars extended the FTC's vision of an implicit
marketplace for privacy by examining ways to explicitly buy and sell
personal information. Laudon proposed "[m]arket-based
mechanisms based on individual ownership of personal information
and a National Information Market ("NIM") in which individuals can
receive fair compensation for the use of information about
themselves." Under this plan, corporations could buy "baskets of
information" containing the financial, health, demographic or other
data that individuals were willing to sell about themselves.3O Varian
sees privacy as the "right not to be annoyed" and suggests web-based
26 Mira G. Baron and Liliya Blekhman, "Evaluating Outdoor Recreation Parks Using TCM:
On the Value of Time" (North American Regional Science Meeting, Charleston, South
Carolina, January 2002), http://ie.technion.ac.il/Home/Users/mbaron/E_21_Baron-
Blekhman_Jan2_2002.pdf.
27 Carlos Jensen and Colin Potts, "Privacy policies as decision-making tools: an evaluation
of online privacy notices" (Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, Vienna, Austria, April 24-29, 2004); CHI 'o4ACM 6, no.1 (2004):
477.
28 Jensen, Potts, and Jensen, "Privacy practices of Internet users: Self-reports versus
observed behavior," 215 (see n. 18).
29 Acquisti and Grossklags, "Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making," 24-
30 (see n. 23).
3o Laudon, "Markets and Privacy," 99 (see n. 4).
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contracts to sell specific information for specific uses during a fixed
time frame.31 Yet no such market of micropayments for personal
information exists. Garfinkel notes that in the current market place,
where corporations re-sell information to other corporations,
payments are already low. He estimates that payments to individuals
for their information would be worth about a penny per name, which
is far lower than most people would be willing to accept.3 2 Since
Garfinkel's analysis, the market for personal information has been
flooded with readily available information. Even stolen information is
worth only about a tenth of what it used to fetch on the black
market.33 Full clickstream data sells for only 40 cents per user per
month,34 yet from the outrage when AOL released search term data to
researchers,35 it is a good guess that most people value their data at a
substantially higher rate than it currently sells for on the open market.
With sellers demanding more than buyers will pay, there is no zone of
possible agreement, and thus it is likely that no transactions would
take place.
In this paper we explore a different way of looking at privacy
transactions. What if online users actually followed the self regulation
vision? What would the cost be if all American Internet users took the
time to read all of the privacy policies for every site they visit each
year? We model this with calculations of the time to read or skim
policies, the average number of unique websites that Internet users
visit each year, and the average value of time, as we present in section
II. In section III, we combine these elements to estimate the total
annual time to read policies as well as the cost to do so, both for
31 Hal R. Varian, "Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy" (faculty Working Paper
Department of Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1996),
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/privacy. See sections "A simple
example/search costs" and "Contracts and markets for information."
32 Garfinkel, Database Nation, 183 (see n. i).
33 Mark Trevelyan, "Stolen account prices fall as market flooded," news.com.au, July 15,
2008, http://www.news.com.au/technology/story/o,25642,24o23758-5o14111,oo.html.
34 Henry Blodget, "Complete CEO: ISPs Sell Clickstreams for $5 a Month," Seeking Alpha,
March 13, 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/29449-compete-ceo-isps-sell-
clickstreams-for-5-a-month.
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individuals and nationwide. We discuss our findings and present our
conclusions in section IV.
II. INPUTS TO THE MODEL
In this section we develop a model to estimate the cost to all
United States Internet users if they read the privacy policy once on
each site they visit annually. We model cost both in terms of time and
the economic value of that time.
We estimate the annual time to read ("TR") online privacy policies as
TR=p*R*n
p is the population of Internet users
R is the average national reading rate
n is the average number of unique sites an Internet user visits
each year
Similarly, we estimate the time to skim ("Ts") online privacy policies
as
Ts= p * S *n
S is the average time to skim a policy
We contrast reading to skimming because while some Internet
users might read privacy policies all the way through, studies in our
lab show that in practice, people may scan privacy policies for specific
information they are interested in learning rather than reading
policies word-for-word.36
Estimating the economic value of time is more complex. As we
discuss in section II.C, based on literature in the value of time domain,
leisure time is valued at a lower hourly rate than value of loss of
productivity during work hours. We estimate time at home as 1/4 W
and time at work as 2W where W represents average wages.
Consequently we estimate not just the annual number of unique
36 Robert W. Reeder, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Patrick G. Kelly, and Aleecia M. McDonald, "A
User Study of the Expandable Grid Applied to P3P Privacy Policy Visualization"
(Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Washington, D.C., October
2008); Proceedings of the 7th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES
'o8), Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 2008: 53.
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websites, but also the proportion of sites that Internet users visit at
home and at work.
A. TIME TO READ OR SKIM PRIVACY POLICIES
We used two different methods to estimate the average time to
read online privacy policies. First, we took the average word length of
the most popular sites' privacy policies and multiplied that by typical
words per minute ("WPM") reading speeds. Second, we performed an
online study and measured the time it took participants to answer
comprehension questions about an online privacy policy. This allows
us to estimate time and costs both for people who read the full policy
word for word, and people who skim policies to find answers to
privacy questions they have. In each case, we use a range of values for
our estimates with median values as a point estimate and high and
low values from the first and third quartiles. 37
1. CALCULATED ESTIMATE TO READ POPULAR WEBSITE PRIVACY
POLICIES
We measured the word count of the 75 most popular websites
based on a list of 30,000 most frequently clicked-on websites from
AOL search data in October, 2005.38 Because these are the most
popular sites, they encompass the sorts of policies Internet users
would be most likely to encounter.
As seen in Figure 1, we found a wide range of policy lengths from a
low of only 144 words to a high of 7,669 words- about 15 pages of text.
We used a range of word count values from the first quartile to the
third quartile, with the mean value as a point estimate.
37 In this paper, the first quartile is the average of all data points below the median; the
third quartile is the average of all data points above the median. These are single values
and not a range of values. Point estimates are our single "best guess" in the face of
uncertainty.
38 Serge Egelman, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Abdur Chowdhury, "An Analysis of P3P-
Enabled Web Sites among Top-20 Search Results' (Proceedings of the Eighth
International Conference on Electronic Commerce, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada,
August 14-16, 2006).
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Figure 1: Probability Density Function ("PDF") and Cumulative
Distribution Function ("CDF") of Word Counts in Popular Website
Privacy Policies.
We calculated the time to read policies as the word length of
common privacy policies times 250 WPM, which is a typical reading
rate for people with a high school education.39
Word Reading Time to Read
Count Rate One Policy
Short Policy
(First Quartile) 2,071 I 250 WPM = 8 minutes
Medium Policy
(Median) 2,514 / 250 WPM = 10 minutes
Long Policy 3,112 / 250 WPM = l2 minutes
(Third Quartile)
Table 1: Times to read entire privacy policies for average readers.
39 Ronald P. Carver, "Is Reading Rate Constant or Flexible?" Reading Research Quarterly
18, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 199, available at http://wwwoJstor.org/stable/747 5 , 7 .
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As seen in Table 1, we find that it takes about eight to twelve
minutes to read privacy policies on the most popular sites, with a
point estimate of ten minutes per policy. These estimates may be
slightly low due to the jargon and advanced vocabulary in privacy
policies. In addition, some people read more slowly online than on
paper, which may also make these time estimates slightly low.
2. MEASURED TIME TO SKIM POLICIES
Internet users might be more likely to skim privacy policies to find
answers to their questions, or to contrast between two policies, rather
than to read the policies word-for-word as envisioned in the prior
section. We performed an online-study that asked participants to find
the answers to questions posed about privacy protections based on the
text of a privacy policy. We based our questions on concerns people
have about online privacy, as studied by Cranor et al.4o We asked five
questions including "Does this policy allow Acme to put you on an
email marketing list?" and "Does the website use cookies?" All
answers were multiple choice, rather than short answer, so the act of
answering should not have substantially increased the time to address
these questions.
To ensure our results were not overly swayed by one unique policy,
participants were presented with one of six different policies of
varying lengths. In all, we had 212 participants from which we
removed 44 outliers.41 We found that the time required to skim
policies does not vary linearly with length, as seen in Figure 2. We
selected one very short policy (928 words), one very long policy (6,329
words) and four policies close to the typical 2,500 word length. The
median times to skim one policy ranged from 18 to 26 minutes. The
lowest first quartile was 12 minutes; the highest third quartile was 37
minutes. The three policies clustered near 2,500 words ranged in
40 Cranor, Guduru, and Arjula, "User Interfaces for Privacy Agents," 167 (see n. 17).
41 During online studies, participants are sometimes distracted by other tasks. We
eliminated data points that were clearly implausible, for instance, taking 5 hours to
complete a set of tasks that typically takes 20 minutes. In similar studies we have also seen
responses indicative of "clicking through" the answers without reading the text. While we
did have a few very speedy respondents that could mathematically be identified as outliers,
we chose to retain them. For example, 3 minute response time is possibly the product of
someone unusually good at the task, rather than someone who did not attempt to
understand the material. In short, we favored removing and retaining outliers in ways that
could slightly underestimate the times we measured.
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median times from 23 to 24 minutes and did not show statistically
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Figure 2: Median times and inter-quartile ranges to skim one privacy
policy.
In a prior study, we asked 93 participants to read an online privacy
policy from a publishing site- the same very short 928 word policy.
We asked very similar questions but included two additional questions
and omitted the time to answer the first question as a training task.
We found a far lower time: a point estimate of six minutes to scan a
privacy policy and find relevant information. This reflects an
artificially low time because, as we have since discovered, the majority
of time spent answering questions is devoted to the very first question.
Even though our follow up study started with a basic question,
participants typically spent a third to half of their time on the very
first question.
Arguably a good lower estimate of the time it takes to skim one
policy is to look at the inverse of our first study: just look at the time
for the first question, provided it is a question that encourages
42 We contrasted the 2,550 word policy to the three similar length policies using two-sided
t-tests assuming unequal variance; 95% confidence interval; p = 0.518, o.69o, o.891.
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exploring the full policy. In our second study we always started with a
warm up question that asked participants to identify the street
address for the company and that information was always in the last
few lines of the policy. Participants had to skim the full policy to
answer the question. As shown in Figure 3, median times ranged
from four minutes to eight minutes. The lowest first quartile of all six
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Figure 3: Median time to answer a basic question in one of six policies of
different lengths, bracketed by interquartile range.
One disadvantage to using just the time for the first question is
that it underestimates because we only look at one question, and a
very basic question at that. When asked to identify why they read
privacy policies, our participants volunteered multiple interests
ranging from data security, to information sales, to spain, to opt-out
policies. These are captured better in the range of times reported in
Figure 2. However, one advantage to using just the time for the first
question is we eliminate the unsatisfying situation that we can
generate longer or shorter overall time estimates just by varying the
number of questions we ask.
We elected to report the more conservative estimates from just
looking at the times to answer the first question, with the caveat that
these numbers are lower estimates. If people were to read policies
2008]
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regularly, presumably they would get faster at finding information,
which is another argument for a more conservative approach. We
used the lowest first quartile and highest third quartile for our low and
high estimates. We averaged the policies' medians as our point
estimate; see Table 2.
Measured Time to Skim and
Answer One Question
Low Estimate 3.6 minutes
Point Estimate 6.3 minutes
High Estimate 11.6 minutes
Table 2: Time estimates to skim one policy and answer a basic question.
B. MONTHLY NUMBER OF UNIQUE WEBSITES VISITED
Nielsen Online reported the average number of unique websites
that United States Internet users visited at home and at work during
March, 2008 as 66 unique sites from work and 119 from home.43 The
overall average number of unique sites visited per person for the same
time period was 105.44 The overall figure is lower than the sum of
sites visited from work and home because there is duplication. For
example, imagine someone who visits Google both at work and at
home. Google would appear once in the count of unique sites visited
at work, plus once in the count of the unique sites visited at home, yet
only be one unique site overall. As depicted in Figure 4, on average
Internet users visit 52 different sites exclusively at work, 105 different
sites exclusively at home, and 14 sites at both work and home.
43 Nielsen/Net Ratings, Internet Audience Metrics, United States,
http://www.netratings.com/resources.jsp?section=prnetv&nav=l (accessed February 26,
2009) (site now updated with data reflecting the present time period).
44 Nielsen/Net Ratings, "Nielsen Online Reports Topline U.S. Data for March 2oo8," news
release, April 14, 2008, http://www.nielsen-online.com/pr/pr-o8o414.pdf.
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Figure 4: Locations where people read websites.
We assume that if people read privacy policies, they would read
them the first time they encountered a given site. We do not know
where people first see the sites they visit both at work and at home.
This uncertainty does not affect our time estimates but does affect our
estimates for the value of that time, since time at work has a higher
economic value than leisure time. As a lower bound estimate, we
assume all of the sites visited at both locations are first encountered at
home. As an upper bound estimate, we assume all of the sites visited
at both locations are first encountered at work. For our point
estimate, we split the difference and assume half are first encountered
at work and half at home. These estimates are summarized in Table 3.
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Estimate Policies read at work Policies read at home
Lower bound 52 / month 119 / month
Point estimate 59 / month 112 / month
Upper bound 66 / month 105 / month
Table 3: Estimates of the monthly number of unique websites visited by
U.S. Internet users.
C. ANNUAL NUMBER OF UNIQUE WEBSITES VISITED
Unfortunately, Nielsen does not collect data on the average
number of websites people visit annually. They do collect weekly
statistics, as shown in Table 4:
Location Unique sites / month Unique sites / week Scale factor
Work 66 25 66%
Home 119 40 74%
Table 4: Unique monthly and weekly websites visited by U.S. Internet
users show repeat visits to many sites week after week.
People visit some of the same sites each week: if not, we would see
loo unique sites per month at home (25 * 4 weeks) rather than 66 (see
Table 4). Ideally we would only count such sites once. From the
Nielsen data we computed a scale factor, which is the percentage of
sites that Internet users return to week after week. While our scale
factor may not actually scale linearly over a full year it is a reasonable
starting point for estimation.
We are unaware of any scholarly work that measures how many
websites people visit annually. However, a 2008 study examined 25
subjects over a variable length of time and found an average of 390
unique sites during 52 to 195 days of observation.45 The mean length
of observation was 105 days. Using our point estimate of 112 unique
sites per month, 390 unique sites suggests nearly all new sites each
month. It seems more likely that these 25 participants, drawn from
the researchers' pool of acquaintance, simply visited more sites per
month than the Nielsen population. We can draw no firm
conclusions. But this study does suggest, even if anecdotally, that our
scale factor is not absurdly low. If anything, we may be conservative
in our estimates.
45 Harald Weinreich and others, "Not quite the average: An empirical study of Web use,"
ACM Transactions on the Trans Web 2, no. 1 (February 2008): 4.
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For all annual estimates, we first multiplied the monthly estimate
by 12 to convert from months to years, and then multiplied by the
appropriate scale factor to account for visitors returning to the same
sites month after month. Scale factors varied by type of estimate. As a
lower bound estimate for the average annual number of websites
visited we multiplied by our lower observed scale factor, o.66. As an
upper bound annual estimate we multiplied our upper monthly
estimate by our higher observed scale factor, 0.74. For our point
estimate we used a weighted average of the observed scale factors,
multiplying the monthly average work sites by the observed work scale
factor of 0.66 and home by o.74. The results are summarized in Table
5.
Estimate Scale Policies Policies Total
factor read read
at work at home
Lower 0.66 412 / year + 942 / year = 1354 / year
bound
Point Weighted 467 / year + 995 / year = 1462 / year
estimate
Upper 0.74 586 / year + 932 / year = 1518 / year
bound
Table 5: Estimates of the annual number of unique websites visited by
U.S. Internet users.
D. OPPORTUNITY COST OF TIME
Just as the opportunity cost of time in school is a major part of the
overall cost of education, Becker argued we should consider the
opportunity cost of time as an implicit cost of goods and services.46
The cost to see a play is not just the price of admission, but also the
value that audience members place on their own time.47 Economics
literature suggests that time should be valued as salary plus overhead,
which is the value corporations lose.48 In the United States, overhead
46 Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," The Economic Journal 75, no. 299
(Sept. 1965): 493, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2228949.
47 Ibid., 495.
48 Leunig, "Time is Money," 493 (see n. 25).
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is estimated as twice the rate of take home pay. 49 However, that
approach may not be an accurate reflection for those who work a fixed
number of hours or are not in the workforce.5o Through revealed-
presences and willingness-to-pay studies, studies estimate people
value their leisure time at one quarter of their take home pay.51
Taken together, this suggests that reading privacy policies at work
should be valued 2W while reading privacy policies at home should be
valued as 1/4W, where W is average wages. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics finds an average hourly wage of $17.93 for March, 2008.52
That gives us estimates of $35.86/hour for the opportunity cost of
reading privacy policies at work and $4.48/hour for the opportunity
cost of reading privacy policies at home as seen below in Table 6.
Location Average value of time
Home $ 4.48 / hour
Work $ 35.86 /hour
Table 6: Estimates for the value of time to read online privacy policies.
III. TIME AND ECONOMIC VALUE TO READ PRIVACY POLICIES
In this section we use the inputs from section II to estimate how
much time it would take for an individual to read the policies of each
website she visits annually. We then use those time estimates as the
basis for calculating the value of that time. In both cases we look at
national figures as well as individuals.
A. AMOUNT OF TIME TO READ PRIVACY POLICIES
We multiplied the estimates for the number of unique sites
American Internet users visit annually (section II.C) by the time to
49 Ronald Eugen Kmetovicz, New Product Development: Design and Analysis (New York:
Wiley-IEEE, 1992): 141.
50 Baron and Blekhman, "Evaluating Outdoor Recreation Parks Using TCM: On The Value
of Time,"2 (see n. 26).
5' Leunig, "Time is Money," 638 (see n. 25).
52 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table B-3. Average hourly and weekly earnings of production




read or skim privacy policies (sections II.A.1 and II.A.2) and by the
estimated 221 million Americans online.53
Estimate Individual Individual National National
time to read time to skim time to read time to skim
Lower 181 hours / 81 hours / 39.9 billion 17.9 billion
bound year year hours / year hours / year
Point 244 hours / 154 hours / 53.8 billion 33.9 billion
Estimate year year hours / year hours / year
Upper 304 hours / 293 hours / 67.1 billion 64.8 billion
bound year year hours / year hours / year
Table 7: Annual time estimates for reading and skimming online privacy
policies.
We estimate that if all American Internet users were to annually
read the online privacy policies word-for-word each time they visited a
new site, the nation would spend about 54 billion hours reading
privacy policies.
To put these figures in perspective, using the point estimate of 244
hours per year to read privacy policies per person means an average of
40 minutes a day. This is slightly more than half of the estimated 72
minutes a day people spend using the Internet.54 This exceeds the
combined percentage of Internet time devoted to shopping (1.9%)
dealing with spam (6.2%) and playing games (13%) in 2005.55 The
estimated time to read privacy policies exceeds the percentage of time
online that people currently spend surfing the web (45.3%).56 One
study estimates the time lost to delays in booting computers with
adware as 60 hours per year per infected user, or about a quarter of
the time we estimate to read privacy policies.57 In 2000, federal
53 Nielsen/Net Ratings, "Nielsen Online Reports" (see n. 44).
54 Norman H. Nie and others, "Ten Years After the Birth of the Internet: How Do
Americans Use the Internet in Their Daily Lives?" (faculty Working Paper Stanford




57 Roger Thompson, "Minimizing liability and productivity risks: How to control the
impacts of spyware, hacker tools and other harmful applications," Computer Associates,
Oct. 2004, http://www.ameinfo.com/pdfdocs/51515.pdf.
2008]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
income tax payers spent an estimated average of 26.4 hours
completing their income taxes and nationwide, U.S. tax payers spent
3.4 billion hours completing federal income taxes58- several times less
than the amount of time we estimate for reading online privacy
policies.
B. VALUE OF TIME TO READ PRIVACY POLICIES
We multiplied the time to read or skim policies by the number of
websites visited at work and the value of time at work, and added that
value to the result from the same procedure for policies at home. For
national costs, we again estimated 221 million Americans online.59
Estimate Individual
cost to read
Lower $2,533 / year
bound (work: $1,970;
home: $563)
Point $3,534 / year
(work: $2,791;
home: $743)










































We estimate that if all American Internet users were to annually
read online privacy policies word-for-word each time they visited a
new site, the nation would lose the value of about $781 billion from
the opportunity cost value of the time to read privacy policies.
Again, to put this in perspective, in 2005 the average cost to
connect to the Internet was $237/year for dial up and $5o8/year for
high speed access. 6o This suggests the value of time lost to reading
58 John L. Guyton, Adam K. Korobow, Peter S. Lee, and Eric J. Toder, "The Effects of Tax
Software and Paid Preparers on Compliance Costs," National Tax Journal 58, no. 3
(2005): 441.
59 Nielsen/Net Ratings, "Nielsen Online Reports" (see n. 44).
60 Scott J. Savage and Donald Waldman, "Broadband Internet access, awareness, and use:
Analysis of United States household data," Telecommunications Policy 29, no. 8 (2005):
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privacy policies would eclipse the cost of high speed Internet access,
several times over. In 2007, United States online sales were
approximately $260 billion 61- more than the cost to businesses if
their employees were to read privacy policies on corporate time.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We estimate that reading privacy policies carries costs in time of
approximately 201 hours a year, worth about $3,534 annually per
American Internet user. Nationally, if Americans were to read online
privacy policies word-for-word, we estimate the value of time lost as
about $781 billion annually.
These estimates presume that people visit sites, read the policies
once a year, and then carry on their business as before. Yet the FTC
vision of self-regulation presumes that, at least for consumer sites,
Internet users will visit multiple sites to comparison shop for
acceptable privacy practices. The true cost of adherence to the self-
regulation vision is perhaps on the order of double the costs we
estimate, depending on which percentage of sites have ready
substitutes and how many sites people are expected to compare. True
costs also include Internet connectivity fees, which we did not attempt
to quantify.
In the opposite direction, media consolidation means that multiple
sites may share one privacy policy. While consolidation itself poses
increased threats to online privacy, in some cases it may actually
reduce the cost of reading privacy policies because there are fewer
unique policies to read. We do note that the resulting privacy policy
when companies merge may be more complex and longer than either
of the individual policies. Another issue is that people may not care
about all possible privacy threats. For instance, if they only care about
credit card theft, and they visit a site that does not collect credit card
numbers, they may not feel the need to protect any information.
Thus, arguably, they do not need to read the policy at every site they
visit, but only a subset of sites.
The value of all online advertising in the United States was about
$21 billion in 2007.62 Many, though by no means all, online privacy
6, "Online sales spike 19 percent," CNN Money.com (May 14, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2oo7/o5/14/news/economy/online-retailing/index.htm.
62 Interactive Advertising Bureau, "Internet Advertising Revenues Top $21 Billion in '07,
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concerns stem from advertisers amassing information about Internet
users in order to present ads targeted to specific demographics. The
current policy decisions surrounding online privacy suggest that
Internet users should give up an estimated $781 billion of their time to
protect themselves from an industry worth substantially less. This is
not to say online advertising should be banned. Sales from direct mail
are approximately an order of magnitude higher than advertising
costs and the cost of online advertisements similarly understates the
full market. 63 But it appears the balance between the costs borne by
Internet users versus the benefits of targeted ads for industry is out of
kilter, at least as envisioned by the FTC's solution that Internet users
read privacy policies.
Some Internet users may realize a benefit from targeted
advertisements; for example Amazon's ability to suggest additional
books they might enjoy based on prior purchase history. Yet on the
whole, advertisements are usually seen as an economic "bad" rather
than a "good" because participants would pay money to eliminate ads
from most types of media.64 While an analysis of the net social welfare
changes created by online advertisement is beyond the scope of this
paper, we do suggest that any such cost-benefit analysis should
include the value of time for reading privacy policies.
Preliminary work from a small pilot study in our laboratory
revealed that some Internet users believe their only serious risk online
is they may lose up to $50 if their credit card information is stolen.
For people who think that is their primary risk, our point estimates
show the value of their time to read policies far exceeds this risk. Even
for our lower bound estimates of the value of time, it is not worth
reading privacy policies. This leads to two implications. First, seeing
their only risk as credit card fraud suggests Internet users likely do not
understand the risks to their privacy. As an FTC report recently
stated, "it is unclear whether consumers even understand that their
information is being collected, aggregated, and used to deliver
advertising." 65 Second, if the privacy community can find ways to
63 Ross D. Petty, "Marketing without consent: Consumer choice and costs, privacy, and
public policy," Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 19, no. i (Spring 2000): 45.
64 Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, "A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or
Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1o8, no. 4 (Nov. 1993): 961, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118455.
65 Federal Trade Commission, "Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-ade: A Report by




reduce the time cost of reading policies, it may be easier to convince
Internet users to do so. For example, if we can help people move from
needing to read policies word-for-word and only skim policies by
providing useful headings, or if we can offer ways to hide all but
relevant information-and thus reduce the effective length of the
policies-more people may be willing to read them.
The privacy community and industry groups have responded with
several attempts to improve privacy policies. Layered privacy notices
specify a few high-level and standardized topics for a one-screen
summary of the policy, then link to the full privacy policy for more
information. 66 The Platform for Privacy Preferences ("P3P") is an
XML-based specification that enables policy authors to code privacy
policies in machine-readable format 67 which fosters comparison
between policies in a standardized way, and provides a common
format for user agents to help Internet users find acceptable policies.
Privacy Bird is a web browser add-on that uses P3P to generate a short
privacy report that presents information in bulleted lists with sections
that expand and contract to show and hide sections of the privacy
policy.68 The P3P Expandable Grid is also built on P3P and uses icons
to convey what information companies collect and how they use it.69
Icons in the Privacy Finder search engine convey how well a given P3P
policy matches users' preferences. A Privacy Finder user study
demonstrated that Internet users will pay a premium for products
from sites rated as more privacy protective.7o Both education and
enhanced privacy policy formats may help Internet users gain the
tools they need to protect themselves online.




67 W3C Working Group, "The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.1 (P3P1.1) Specification,"
November 2006, http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11.
68 Cranor, Guduru, and Arjula, "User Interfaces for Privacy Agents," 149 (see n. 17).
69 Reeder, and others, "A User Study of the Expandable Grid Applied to P3P Privacy Policy
Visualization," 9 (see n. 36)
70 Janice Tsai, Serge Egelman, Lorrie F. Cranor, and AlessandroAcquisti, "The Effect of
Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study" (Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security, Pittsburgh, PA, June 7-8, 2007), 15,
http://weis2oo7.econinfosec.org/papers/57.pdf.
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Finally, some corporations take the view that their users should
read privacy policies and if they fail to do so, it is evidence of lack of
concern about privacy. Instead, we counter that websites need to do a
better job of conveying their practices in useable ways, which includes
reducing the time it takes to read policies. If corporations cannot do
so, regulation may be necessary to provide basic privacy protections.
Disclosure legislation may be insufficient: adding more text to policies
that most consumers do not read does increase transparency, but may
otherwise be of limited practical utility.
